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Native American Sovereignty Meets a Bend in the
Road: Difficulties in Nevada v. Hicks
The path the Supreme Court has forged with regard to tribal
sovereignty has meandered through a variety of landscapes with little
predictability. The Court finally established a guiding light for determining tribal jurisdiction in the 1980s through the seminal case,
Montana v. United States,1 but since that time has taken several turns
in the road. Most recently, in Nevada v. Hicks,2 the Court ventured
away from the security of known paths by redefining and limiting the
scope of tribal sovereignty in two ways. First, the Court’s recharacterization of the traditional approach for determining tribal authority
over nonmembers outlined in Montana resulted in a constriction of
the Court’s precedent regarding the role of land ownership and
Montana’s exceptions. Second, the Court’s limit of tribal authority
to try federal § 1983 claims suggests that tribes may be limited in adjudicating certain federal claims in their own courts.
This Note begins with a discussion of Native American judicial
authority, addressing both tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers and
tribal jurisdiction over federal claims. Part II briefly explains the factual and procedural background of the Nevada v. Hicks decision.
Part III analyzes the Court’s application of the Montana test and the
exhaustion doctrine to determine the tribe’s jurisdiction in Nevada v.
Hicks. Part IV critiques this analysis, while Part V suggests possible
routes that the Court may take in the future, especially with respect
to the importance of land status under Montana. Part VI concludes
that the Court’s constriction of these tests leaves tribes with little recourse against nonmember civil offenders.
I. THE FEDERAL LAW FRAMEWORK OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION
Since 1978, Native American tribes have had limited jurisdiction
over those who do not belong to their tribes.3 This section estab-

1. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
2. 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
3. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (denying tribal
courts criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers); Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (limiting tribal court
authority over non-Indians in civil matters).
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lishes a foundation for understanding tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers by first discussing tribal jurisdiction over acts of nonmembers and then evaluating general tribal jurisdiction over federal
claims.
A. Tribal Authority over Nonmembers
“Indian tribes have long been held to have ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.’”4 Although the
relationship between tribes and the federal government has divested
tribes of certain aspects of their inherent sovereignty,5 and the Court
has firmly established Congress’ plenary power over Indian country,6
4. Sandra Hansen, Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 319, 324 (1991) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
142 (1980); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); and citing United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56
(1978)).
5. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the Court recognized Indian tribes as separate sovereigns with inherent sovereignty but concluded that this sovereignty
was diminished as a result of European discovery of the land. Id. at 587; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831) (affirming divestiture of Indian tribes’ sovereign rights to convey lands and enter into treaties with foreign nations). The Court later
came to describe Indian nations as “domestic dependent nations,” comparing the relationship
between tribes and the federal government to the relationship between a ward and its guardian. See id., 30 U.S. at 17.
Cherokee Nation, though based in part upon egocentric ideals, see id. at 17 (Indians “are
in a state of pupilage”), has formed a basis for the ideas that Congress has broad power to legislate on behalf of tribes and the Court has little power to review Congress’s acts so long as
they are rationally tied to Congress’s obligation towards Indians. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 535 (1974) (finding statute
creating checkerboard state and tribal jurisdiction on reservation constitutional because rationally tied to the interest of protecting Indians).
6. Federal statute defines Indian country as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities . . . , and (c) all Indian allotments . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
Congress’s plenary power over Indian Country has been established in many cases. See,
e.g., Washington, 439 U.S. 463 (holding that a state has power to create a checkerboard jurisdictional pattern when acting in response to congressional acts); United States v. Antelope,
430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977) (finding the Major Crimes Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994), constitutional, although resulting in different burdens of proof for tribal members and non-Indians and
holding that “[s]ince Congress has undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal
code applicable in Indian country, [it makes no legal difference] that the federal scheme differs
from a state criminal code otherwise applicable”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)
(legislation will not be disturbed as long as it is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress’s
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the Court has nonetheless emphasized that tribes retain many rights
of internal self-government, including “the power to punish tribal
offenders, . . . to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for
members.”7
Despite the fact that Indian tribes retain authority over internal
aspects of tribal government because of their inherent sovereignty,
Congress and the Court have abrogated the tribes’ authority over
nonmembers.8 This section will focus on tribal jurisdiction over civil
acts by nonmembers. It will first analyze tribal regulatory authority
over nonmembers under the test established in Montana v. United
States,9 highlighting two exceptions to this test. It will next look at
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.
1. Tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers
“Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”10 The Court has
firmly established that tribes have no jurisdiction over nonmember
defendants involved in criminal actions in Indian country,11 but the
unique obligation towards Indians); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding
that Congress’s power to legislate on behalf of Indians includes the right to abrogate their
treaties and that such legislation is not subject to judicial review); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886) (recognizing congressional authority to grant the federal government
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country).
7. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (1981).
8. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (“[T]he dependent status of Indian tribes within our
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine
their external relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe
and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations
among members of a tribe.”); see also supra note 5 (describing tribal sovereignty).
9. 450 U.S. 544.
10. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–53 (“Executive branch
officials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a
significant interest.” (citing 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 214 (1900); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 174 (1885); 17
Op. Att’y Gen. 134 (1881))). But see Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 451–52 (1997)
(dismissing the statement in Iowa Mutual on the grounds that Montana established a presumption against tribal sovereignty); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2321
(2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (same).
11. Tribes have no authority to criminally try non-Indians even when the criminal acts
occur on reservation lands, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), although they do retain some authority to criminally try tribal members. See Wheeler, 435 U.S.
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Court has not created a bright-line rule for tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember defendants in civil actions. Instead, the Court has created a general common law framework for evaluating tribal jurisdiction in civil proceedings. Montana v. United States12 serves as the
baseline.
In Montana the Court determined that the Crow Tribe had no
authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land
owned by non-Indians within reservation boundaries.13 The Court
held that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not

313 (holding that a tribe may prosecute members for lesser offenses arising out of same facts as
a major crime); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is the guiding authority for tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers. The Suquamish Indian Tribe commenced criminal proceedings against two nonIndians residing on the Port Madison Reservation in Washington. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
When the defendants appealed jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that “Indians do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress,” id. at 208, rejecting the tribe’s argument that criminal jurisdiction was part of its “retained inherent powers of government.” Id. at 195–96. The Court determined that such jurisdiction would be “inconsistent with their status” as domestic dependent nations. Id. at 208
(quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal SelfGovernment and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1139 [hereinafter Skibine, Reconciling]. See generally N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court
Strikes Two More Blows Against Tribal Self-Determination, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T., Fall
2001, at 118, 119 (Fall 2001) (“Oliphant dramatically influenced the nature and scope of litigation in federal Indian law by inviting challenges not merely to the exercise of inherent tribal
authority, but rather to its very existence.”). However, the Court explained that “Indian tribes
do retain elements of ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority” and that these “retained powers are not such
that they are limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments.” Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (citation omitted).
One week after Oliphant, in Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, the Court held that the Navajo
Tribe had authority to convict a tribal member of certain crimes, even though he was later tried
in federal court, finding that tribal powers of self-government encompassed internal “relations
among members of a tribe.” Id. at 314–16, 326; see also Skibine, Reconciling, supra, at 1139
(citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326) (discussing the differences in the Court’s reasoning of Oliphant and Wheeler). Notably, the only previous decisions to address tribal authority over external relations were Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11–12 (1831), and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), both of which “made clear . . . that . . . ‘external relations’ . . . meant relations between Indian nations and foreign nations.” Skibine,
Reconciling, supra, at 1139–40 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11–12) (footnote omitted).
In fact, later “the Court adopted the position that even if external relations were involved, the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction was not per se inconsistent with tribal status . . . . [I]n cases involving external relations, the tribe bore the burden to show that jurisdiction over nonmembers was necessary to tribal self-government.” Id. at 1140 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–
66).
12. 450 U.S. 544.
13. Id. at 557.
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extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”14 Because the
tribe’s regulation of nonmembers on their fee lands “bore no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize the
Crow Tribe to regulate the non-Indian fishing.”15 Thus, the Court
set forth a general rule that tribes have limited power to regulate
nonmember conduct on non-Indian fee land within a reservation.
However, the Court recognized that had the tribe sought to
regulate activities occurring on tribal trust lands, rather than on nonIndian fee lands, the tribe would have had authority to either condition nonmembers’ entry or to exclude them altogether.16 Additionally, despite the Court’s finding that inherent sovereignty does not
give rise to “regulatory authority over non-Indians,”17 the Court determined that in two cases “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”18

14. Id. at 565 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191(1978)). The Court found that the tribe
was “implicit[ly] divest[ed] of [tribal] sovereignty [over] . . . the relations between an Indian
tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.” Id. at 564 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
Montana is viewed as an extension of the notion of divestiture suggested in Oliphant,
435 U.S. 191 (1978). See Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, 119; see also supra note 11 (discussing Oliphant).
15. H. Scott Althouse, Idaho Nibbles at Montana: Carving out a Third Exception for
Tribal Jurisdiction over Environmental and Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 721,
734 (2001) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65).
16. The Court stated,
[T]he regulatory issue before us is a narrow one . . . . [T]he Tribe may prohibit
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the
United States in trust for the Tribe . . . . [I]f the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish
or hunt on such lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing
bag and creel limits.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 557; see also Skibine, Reconciling, supra note 11, at 1140 n.175:
[O]ne can argue that Montana adopted the position that what made [the] case an
exercise of external relations was not that it involved non-Indians; rather it involved
non-Indians on non-Indian lands. Therefore, if the fishing by the non-Indians had
taken place on tribal land, one could argue that the fishing did not involve external
relations; thus, the burden would still be on the non-Indians to show why tribal jurisdiction was not necessary to tribal self-government.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 557); cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982) (“Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent
of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember’s presence and conduct on Indian
lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to impose.”).
17. Althouse, supra note 15, at 730 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
18. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
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First, a tribe might retain civil authority over a nonmember on an
Indian reservation when that nonmember enters into a consensual
relationship with the tribe.19 Second, a tribe might retain civil authority over a nonmember when that nonmember’s “conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”20
a. Montana’s consensual relations exception. The Montana Court
relied on Williams v. Lee21 as authority for its first exception. In Williams, a non-Indian who operated a store on the Navajo Indian Reservation brought suit against tribal members in state court to recover
the cost of goods sold.22 The Court found that the state court had
no jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit because the transaction took
place on the reservation. Recognizing its history of “guard[ing] the
authority of Indian governments over their reservations,”23 the Court
emphasized that state adjudicatory authority would “infring[e] on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them.”24
The Court has, however, determined that only certain relationships qualify as consensual.25 In Montana, the Court cited cases that
dealt only with commercial dealings, leading lower courts to subse-

19. Id. (“A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–154 (1980); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135
F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905)).
20. Id. at 566 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386, (1976); Williams,
358 U.S. at 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128–129
(1906); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898)). Montana Catholic and Thomas v. Gay
both found that a tax on cattle grazing on tribal lands was too remotely related to tribal interests to warrant tribal authority. See Montana Catholic, 200 U.S. at 128–29; Thomas, 169 U.S.
at 273.
21. 358 U.S. 217.
22. Id. at 217–18.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Id. at 220.
25. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1833 (2001)
(“The consensual relationship must stem from ‘commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements,’ . . . and a nonmember’s actual or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, and
medical services does not create the requisite connection.” (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at
565)); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997) (“Measured against [the] cases
[cited in Montana], the Fredericks-Stockert highway accident presents no ‘consensual relationship’ of the qualifying kind.”).
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quently hold that a relationship must involve commercial dealings in
order to be viewed as a consensual relationship under this exception.26
b. Montana’s political integrity exception. Although the Montana
Court’s language suggests the second exception could be quite
broad, “the Supreme Court has limited the general holding to activities that the United States considers critical to tribal self government,
and to internal relations.”27 A tribe might be able to assert authority
in order to protect its political integrity in only a few situations—the
punishment of tribal offenders, the determination of tribal membership, the regulation of domestic relations, the prescription of rules of
inheritance.28
The Court struggled with the meaning of this exception in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,29
where it held in a plurality opinion that a tribe had authority to zone

26. See, e.g., Boxx v. Long Warrior, 265 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A relationship
is of the qualifying kind only if it is both consensual and entered into through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. To the extent that the relationship cannot be
neatly categorized as one entered through commercial dealing, contracts, or leases, but is instead characterized as one entered through ‘other arrangements,’ we conclude that such arrangements also must be of a commercial nature.”); cf. In re W. Wireless Corp., CC No. 9645, 2001 WL 1181249 (F.C.C.), at *5 (finding a consensual relationship between wireless
carrier and tribe under Montana, where wireless carrier “expressly consented to the Tribe’s
regulatory authority, and the Tribe has rights to participate extensively in and administer the
service plan”).
27. Althouse, supra note 15, at 735–36.
28. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe arguably
additionally grants tribes the authority under the second exception to tax nonmembers who
chose to do business on the reservation. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (finding that the tribe’s
authority to tax nonmembers who chose to do business on the reservation falls within its sovereign powers as a “necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management”).
However, the authority to tax nonmembers may also fall under the consensual relations exception. See Atkinson Trading, 121 S. Ct. at 1832–33 (citing Merrion in discussing whether a
consensual relationship existed between a hotel and the tribe that sought to tax it).
Montana’s political integrity exception draws its authority in part from Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). In Fisher, a Montana state court sought to exert authority over
an adoption proceeding that took place on the reservation of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in
Montana. See id. at 383. The Court found that the tribal court had authority over the proceeding because the “litigation [arose] out of conduct on an Indian reservation” and unless Congress enacts a law stating otherwise, the “resolution of conflicts between the jurisdiction of
state and tribal courts has depended . . . on ‘whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” Id. at 386 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). Notably, however, Fisher involved only tribal members, not the assertion of a tribe’s authority over nonmembers. See id.
29. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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certain parcels of land held by nonmembers on a reservation, but not
other parcels on the same reservation. Justice White’s opinion limited Montana’s health and welfare exception by determining that “a
tribe’s authority need not extend to all conduct that ‘threatens or has
some direct effect’ . . . but instead depends on the circumstances.”30
Justice Blackmun, however, indicated that “fundamental sovereign
power of local governments to control land use is especially vital to
Indians, who enjoy a unique historical and cultural connection to the
land”31 and emphasized that “the nature of land ownership does not
diminish the tribe’s inherent power to regulate in the area.”32 The
Court reached no consensus on the proper scope of this exception,
and “[i]n the end, the tribes’ power to zone each parcel of land
turned on the extent to which the tribes maintained ownership and
control over the areas in which the parcels were located.”33
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,34 the last major Supreme
Court decision dealing with tribal authority before Hicks, the Court
established a far higher threshold for the political integrity exception
than originally articulated in Montana: “[U]nless the drain of the
nonmember’s conduct upon tribal services and resources is so severe
that it actually ‘imperil[s]’ the political integrity of the Indian tribe,
there can be no assertion of civil authority beyond tribal lands.”35
2. Tribal adjudicatory authority
Although Montana dealt only with regulatory authority, in Strate
v. A-1 Contractors 36 the Court “extended the Montana framework . . . to limit tribes’ civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.”37 In Iowa

30. Althouse, supra note 15, at 736 (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429).
31. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 457.
33. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2326 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 438–44, 444–47).
34. 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
35. Id. at 1834 n.12. The Court found that the tribe did not have inherent authority to
collect a hotel occupancy tax from nonmembers operating a hotel on the reservation because
the tribe established no nexus between the tax and the tribe’s relationship with the hotel. Id. at
1834–35; see also Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 120 (describing the Court’s holding).
36. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
37. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2321 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. at 453 (“As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction . . . . Subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statues, and
the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts
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Mutual,38 the Court found “[t]ribal authority over the activities of
non-Indians on reservation lands [to be] an important part of tribal
sovereignty.”39
Determining a tribal court’s jurisdiction over civil court proceedings “require[s] a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes.”40 In National
Farmers Union,41 the Court unanimously distinguished between
criminal and civil proceedings by explaining that Congress has expressly granted federal court jurisdiction over criminal offenses arising between non-Indians and Indians but has not granted express
federal jurisdiction over similar civil disputes.42

with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally ‘do[es] not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.’” (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565)); Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2315 n.9 (noting that Strate “held that [adjudicatory authority] at best tracks [regulatory authority]”).
38. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
39. Id. at 18. The Court held that tribes possess civil adjudicatory jurisdiction “unless
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.” Id.; see also Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982) (“Because the Tribe retains all inherent
attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper
inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.”); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and
for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence
of clear indications of legislative intent.”).
40. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56
(1985) (unanimous); see also Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 562 (1997) (describing the Court’s
holding).
41. 471 U.S. 845.
42. Id. at 854 n.16 (citing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 253
(1982)) (“The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country has
been markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.”).
Although the Oliphant Court determined that tribes had no jurisdiction over nonIndians for criminal offenses, that Court relied in part on an Attorney General statement that
denied tribes jurisdiction over criminal proceedings but granted jurisdiction over civil proceedings. The Attorney General’s opinion stated, in part,
Congress has “paramount right” to legislate in regard to this question, in all its relations. It has legislated, in so far as it saw fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal matters, and omitting to take jurisdiction in civil matter[s] . . . . By all possible rules of
construction the inference is clear that jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves
of civil controversies arising strictly within the Choctaw Nation.
7 Op. Att’y Gen. 175, 179–81 (1855).
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Following Montana’s precedent,43 however, the Court continued
to consider land ownership as a threshold analysis in determining
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. In Strate, the Court held that the
Three Affiliated Tribes44 did not have jurisdiction over claims asserted against nonmembers and arising out of a car accident on the
state road that ran through the reservation because the state road
equated to non-Indian land,45 but left open the question of the
proper jurisdiction for “an accident occur[ring] on a tribal road
within a reservation.”46 Instead the Court stated in dicta, “We ‘can
readily agree,’ in accord with Montana, . . . that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land.”47
Neither of the Montana exceptions applied to the facts of Strate.
First, because neither party to the suit was a tribal member, no consensual relationship existed.48 Second, because careless driving did
not pose a direct threat on the “political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe,” the second exception
was likewise inapplicable.49 The Court found that an action arising
43. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
44. The Three Affiliated Tribes are the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Airkara tribes. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 443 (1997). They reside on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. See id. at 442.
45. Id. at 442, 454. In Strate, Fredericks, a non-Indian, was involved in an accident
with Stockert, another non-Indian who worked for a non-Indian-owned enterprise doing contractual work on the reservation for the tribe. Id. at 442–43. Fredericks sued Stockert and his
employer in tribal court and the defendants argued for dismissal of the case, based on the
court’s lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 444. After the tribal court ruled
against dismissal of the case, the defendants commenced proceedings against jurisdiction in
federal court. Id. In ruling against tribal court jurisdiction, the Court explained that “the rightof-way North Dakota acquired for the State’s highway render[ed] the 6.59-mile stretch equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes to alienated, non-Indian land.” Id. at 454. The
Court pointed out that the tribe granted consent to the right-of-way, was compensated for use
of the right-of-way, “expressly reserved no right to exercise dominion or control over the
right-of-way,” and reserved no gatekeeping right to the highway. Id. at 455. The Court further pointed out that the highway was open to the public and subject to the state’s control. Id.
at 455–56.
46. Id. at 442.
47. Id. at 454 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 557); see also id. at 456 (“We . . . align the
right-of-way, for the purpose at hand, with land alienated to non-Indians. Our decision in
Montana, accordingly, governs this case.”).
48. Id. at 457 (The “tribes were strangers to the accident.”).
49. Id. at 452, 457 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). The Court emphasized that
“[a tribe’s inherent power does not reach] beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations,” id. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564),
concluding that “[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident at issue [was] needed to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
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under the second exception must affect the integrity of the tribe as a
whole, not simply redress the wrongs inflicted upon one tribal member.50
The court dismissed the fact that “[c]ivil jurisdiction over [nonIndian] activities [on reservation lands] presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision
or federal statute,”51 interpreting the statement simply to mean that
“where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers” they also possess authority to adjudicate disputes arising out of
such activities, but the Court also explained that “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”52
B. Tribal Authority over Federal Claims
Determining a tribe’s jurisdiction “require[s] a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has
been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties
and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”53 The Court
has found that tribal courts are valid forums for vindicating federal
rights.54
and be ruled by them.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). An action
arising under the second exception must affect the integrity of the tribe as a whole, not simply
redress the wrongs inflicted upon one tribal member.
50. Id. at 459 (“Opening the Tribal Court for [Fredericks’] optional use is not necessary
to protect tribal self-government; and requiring A-1 and Stockert to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to ‘the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes].” (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566)); see also Boxx v. Long Warrior, 265 F.3d 771, 777 (9th Cir.
2001) (dismissing Montana’s second exception because “[t]he action in tribal court does not
seek to enforce or control the distribution or consumption of alcohol on the reservation.
Rather, it seeks damages for negligence”).
51. Strate, 520 U.S. at 451 (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18
(1987)); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2321 (2001) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (pointing out that Montana introduces the presumption of no sovereignty, while
Washington and Fisher illustrate the two exceptions to Montana).
52. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18).
53. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855–56 (1985) (footnote omitted).
54. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (finding that tribal courts
are appropriate forums for trying cases under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1303 (1994), and recognizing tribal courts as “appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians
and non-Indians”).
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In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,55 the Court recognized
in dicta that “tribal courts, like state courts, can and do decide questions of federal law.”56 The Court did not allow the Navajo Nation
to try claims arising under the Price-Anderson Act57 solely because
the statute clearly expressed a preference that claims be tried in federal courts by providing for an immediate removal from state courts
to federal courts.58 Although the statute did not mention removal
from tribal courts, the Court dismissed this problem as being due to
simple inadvertence.59
Although it has been suggested that Neztsosie holds “that the
tribal exhaustion rule does not require abstention where the underlying, substantive claim would be removable to federal court if
brought initially in state court,”60 at least one federal appellate court
has discredited this approach “because [Neztsosie] elsewhere emphasizes and relies upon the extraordinarily powerful congressional preference that nuclear accident claims be adjudicated in federal court,
and it is therefore possible that the [Neztsosie] opinion is statutespecific.”61
II. NEVADA V. HICKS
A. The Facts
Approximately 900 members comprise the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribes in western Nevada.62 Hicks, a member of the tribe
and a retired tribal police officer, lived on trust allotment lands

55. 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
56. Id. at 485 n.7; see also Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1241 (2001) (“Justice
Souter was careful to point out [in Neztsosie] that only in cases involving complete preemption,
such as those brought under the Price-Anderson Act, can defendants correctly assert that they
need not exhaust their tribal court remedies.”).
57. 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
58. See Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 484, 485.
59. Id. at 487 (“Now and then silence [regarding tribal courts] is not pregnant.”).
60. Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 476).
61. Id. at 84 (finding that Neztsosie offers merely “a potential alternative basis for [the]
ruling,” but basing its holding on other grounds and avoiding the issue of general tribal authority to adjudicate federal claims (citing Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 486)).
62. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2001).
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within the tribe’s reservation.63 In 1990, after Hicks was suspected of
killing a California bighorn sheep off the reservation,64 the Nevada
state court issued a search warrant to inspect Hicks’s property.65 Believing that the state court had no jurisdiction on the reservation, the
judge issued the warrant “‘SUBJECT TO OBTAINING
APPROVAL FROM THE FALLON TRIBAL COURT IN AND
FOR THE FALLON PAIUTE-SHOSHONE TRIBES.’”66 The state
wardens obtained a tribal court search warrant and, along with a
tribal police officer, searched Hicks’s premises, finding no incriminating evidence.67
After about a year, “a tribal police officer reported to the warden
that he had observed two mounted bighorn sheep heads in respondent’s home.”68 After obtaining a search warrant from the state court
and once more obtaining permission from the tribe, the wardens
searched Hicks’s home another time, again finding no evidence of
the crime.69
B. Procedural History
Hicks brought civil proceedings in the tribal court against the
state wardens in their official and individual capacities and the State
of Nevada, as well as the tribal judge and the tribal officers, alleging
that the state wardens and tribal officers damaged his sheep-heads
and “that the second search exceeded the bounds of the warrant.”70
In addition to alleging these claims under tribal law, Hicks brought
various constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.71 The
Tribal Court dismissed the claims against all tribal parties by directed

63. Id.; Respondents’ Brief, 2001 WL 57509, at *3, *5, Hicks (No. 99-1994).
64. The killing of a California bighorn sheep is a gross misdemeanor under Nevada state
law. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 501.376 (1999).
65. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2308.
66. Id. at 2308 (quoting App. G to Pet. for Cert. 1).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id. (citation omitted). This warrant “did not explicitly require permission from the
Tribes.” Id. However, upon the state wardens’ securing a tribal court warrant, tribal officers
accompanied the state wardens on the search. Id.
70. Id. “Respondent’s causes of action included trespass to land and chattels, abuse of
process, and violation of civil rights—specifically, denial of equal protection, denial of due
process, and unreasonable search and seizure . . . .” Id.
71. Id. Hicks’s causes of action under the federal statute included “denial of equal
protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure.” Id.
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verdict, and Hicks dismissed the claims against the state wardens in
their official capacities, leaving only the claims against the state officials in their individual capacities and the claims against the State at
issue in the Tribal Court.72
The Tribal Court determined that it had authority to try both
Hicks’s tribal and federal claims, and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed.73 Thereafter, the state wardens and the State of Nevada
sought a judgment in federal district court declaring that the Tribal
Court had no jurisdiction to try the claim.74 Hicks also filed a motion
for summary judgment regarding tribal court jurisdiction. The District Court granted Hicks’s motion, while denying the state defendants’ motion.75 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, determining that because Hicks’s “home [was] located on
tribe-owned land within the reservation,” the tribe could assert “jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.”76 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.77
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reversed the lower courts’
decisions regarding the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction.78 The Court
found (1) that the Tribal Court had no authority to adjudicate
Hicks’s tort claims against the state officials79 and (2) that the Tribal
Court had no authority to try § 1983 claims.80
III. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the reasoning of the court in Nevada v.
Hicks by examining each of the questions answered by the Court.
First, it considers the Court’s analysis under the Montana test of
tribal court jurisdiction for tort offenses arising from the state officials’ execution of process. Second, it evaluates tribal court jurisdic-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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Id.
Id. at 2308–09.
Id.
See id. at 2309; Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F.Supp. 1455, 1459 (1996).
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020 (1999)).
Nevada v. Hicks, 531 U.S. 923 (2000).
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2304.
Id. at 2313.
Id. at 2315.
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tion over federal claims by considering jurisdiction of the § 1983
claims and the Court’s elimination of the exhaustion test. This analysis casts doubt on the Court’s decision by suggesting that the Court
misapplied Montana and failed to allow the tribe to initially evaluate
its jurisdiction over federal claims.
A. Tribal Court Jurisdiction over State Wardens: The Montana Test
The Court first determined whether “the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribe ha[d] jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged tortious
conduct of state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of
an off-reservation crime . . . .”81 Beginning with a recognition that
“[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction,”82 the Court first examined
whether the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes had the authority to
“regulate state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of an
off-reservation claim.”83
The Court explained that Montana, as well as Oliphant v.
Suquamish Tribe,84 “support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”85 “Where nonmembers are concerned, the ‘exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.’”86
Three points from Montana played in the Court’s determination
that the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked jurisdiction over
Hicks’s claim—the importance of land ownership, the consensual relations exception to Montana, and the political integrity exception to
Montana.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
(1981)).
86.

Id. at 2309.
Id. at 2309 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)).
Id. at 2309.
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565
Id. at 2309–10 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
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1. Land ownership
The Court dismissed the fact that the tortious actions occurred
on tribal trust allotment lands, explaining that “[t]he ownership
status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in determining
whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’”87 Although the Court noted that ownership of land “may sometimes be
a dispositive factor” and recognized that “the absence of ownership
has been virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal civil jurisdiction,”88 it failed to recognize a reverse rule that events occurring on
tribal lands can give rise to tribal court jurisdiction.89
The Court distinguished the importance of land ownership in
Montana and Strate by explaining that those cases rested on the
proposition that the land ownership concept in those cases was a divergence from Oliphant’s lack of distinctions based upon land, rather
than the idea that “Indian ownership suspends the ‘general proposition’ derived from Oliphant that ‘the inherent sovereign powers of
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations.’”90 The Court found instead that Oliphant drew no distinctions based upon land and Montana explained that “‘Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands,’ . . . implying that the
general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian
land.”91
Finding that ownership by itself could not “support regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers,”92 the Court considered instead
whether the tribe’s jurisdiction was “‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations,’ and, if not, whether

87. Id. at 2310.
88. Id.
89. But see Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (holding that had the tribe sought to regulate
hunting and fishing on tribal, it would have had authority to do so); Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (leaving open the question as to whether the tribe would have had
jurisdiction had the automobile accident occurred on tribal trust lands).
90. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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such regulatory jurisdiction ha[d] been congressionally conferred.”93
Instead of following Montana by analyzing land ownership as a
threshold factor, the Court employed a balancing test, finding that
land ownership was not dispositive “when weighed against the
State’s interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its laws.”94
Justice O’Connor argued in her concurrence that the Court
failed to give appropriate weight to land ownership considerations.95
She explained that, rather than laying out a blanket rule that tribes
may never have jurisdiction over civil offenses involving nonmembers, as is the case with criminal jurisdiction, Montana provides a
“middle ground” analysis by “recogniz[ing] that tribes retain sovereign interests in activities that occur on land owned and controlled
by the tribe, and provid[ing] principles that guide [a] determination
of whether particular activities by nonmembers implicate these sovereign interests to a degree that tribal civil jurisdiction is appropriate.”96
Justice Souter, on the other hand, argued that Montana’s “presumption against tribal jurisdiction to nonmember conduct on fee
land within a reservation [should also] apply . . . where . . . a nonmember acts on tribal or trust land,” stating that “land status within
a reservation is not a primary jurisdictional fact, but is relevant only
insofar as it bears on the application of one of Montana’s exceptions
to a particular case.”97 He asserted that Strate set forth a rule that “a
tribe’s . . . inherent civil jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims arising
out of acts committed on a reservation depends in the first instance
on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed,
not on the title to the soil on which he acted.”98 Finally, he sug93. Id.
94. Id. at 2316 (“‘The State’s interest in execution of process is considerable’ enough to
outweigh the tribal interest in self-government ‘even when it relates to Indian-fee land’”
(quoting id. at 2312)).
95. Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense
Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347, 354–55 (2001)
[hereinafter Skibine, Making Sense] (finding “exasperating” Justice O’Connor’s statement that
Montana did not clarify “‘whether the status of the persons being regulated or the status of the
land where the hunting and fishing occurred, led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule and exceptions’” because the Montana Court made clear that a “‘nonmember’s
hunting and fishing could be controlled on tribal land’” (quoting Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2325
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Montana, 450 U.S. at 556)).
96. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 2318 (Souter, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring). He continued,
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gested that basing tribal authority upon land status would result in
practical difficulties of administration.99
2. Montana’s consensual relations exception
In addition to disregarding the importance of land ownership,
the Hicks Court dismissed Montana’s first exception in a footnote by
explaining that consensual relations cannot exist between state officers and a tribe.100 Although the state wardens “‘consensually’ obtained a warrant from the Tribal Court before searching [Hicks’s]
home and yard,” the Montana exception was inapplicable notwithstanding because the relationship between the state warden and the
tribal court was public rather than private.101
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor criticized the fact that the
Court “treats as dispositive the fact that nonmembers in this case are
state officials”102 and pointed to several examples of consensual relationships between state and tribal governments already in existence.103 Even if a consensual relationship did not exist in Hicks,104

The principle on which Montana and Strate were decided (like Oliphant before
them) looks first to human relationships, not land records, and it should make no
difference per se whether acts committed on a reservation occurred on tribal land or
on land owned by a nonmember individual in fee. It is the membership status of the
unconsenting party, not the status of real property, that counts as the primary jurisdictional fact.
Id. But see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (“[T]here is a
significant geographic component to tribal sovereignty.”).
99. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Trib[al] authority to land
status in the first instance would produce an unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt.”). But see
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979) (holding that a state’s exercise of checkerboard jurisdiction is constitutional).
100. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2310 n.3.
101. Id. (“Though the wardens . . . ‘consensually’ obtained a warrant from the Tribal
Court before searching respondent’s home and yard, we do not think this qualifies as an ‘other
arrangement’ within the meaning of [Montana’s exception]. Read in context, an ‘other
arrangement’ is clearly another private consensual relationship . . . .”).
102. Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She states, “The majority . . . dismisses the
applicability of [the consensual relationship] exception in a footnote, concluding that any consensual relationship between tribes and nonmembers ‘clearly’ must be a ‘private’ consensual
relationship ‘from which the official actions at issue in this case are far removed.’” Id. (quoting
id. at 2310 n.3).
103. See id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor points out, for instance, that tribes may enter into contractual relationships with state governments “for services
or shared authority over public resources,” explaining that “[s]ome States have formally sanctioned the creation of tribal-state agreements.” Id. (citing as examples MONT. CODE ANN. §§
18-11-101 to 18-11-112 (1997) (State-Tribal Cooperative Agreements Act); NEB. REV. STAT.
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Justice O’Connor argued that “creat[ing] a per se rule . . . forecloses
future debate as to whether cooperative agreements, or other forms
of official consent, could ever be a basis for tribal jurisdiction.”105
3. Montana’s political integrity exception
Finally, the Court addressed “whether regulatory jurisdiction
over state officers . . . is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations.’”106 The Court emphasized that
“[t]ribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be
connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them.”107 However, it dismissed the fact that a tribe
could exercise jurisdiction based solely on its inherent sovereignty by
explaining that “it was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court departed from
Chief Justice Marshall’s view that the laws of [a State] can have no
force within reservation boundaries.’”108
Instead, the Court drew upon Strate to determine the ways in
which tribes could exercise power to protect their self-interest, concluding that a tribe’s authority includes only that which is necessary
“‘[to punish tribal offenders,] to determine tribal membership, to
regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules
of inheritance for members.’”109 In acknowledging a difference be§§ 13-1502 to 13-1509 (1997) (State-Tribal Cooperative Agreements Act); OKLA. STAT. tit.
74, § 1221 (Supp. 2001) (Governor may enter into cooperative agreements on the State’s behalf to address issues mutually affecting the State and tribes)). Justice O’Connor additionally
points out the “host of cooperative agreements between tribes and state authorities to share
control over tribal lands, to manage public services, and to provide law enforcement.” Id. (citing as examples CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25198.1–25198.9 (West 1992 & Supp.
2001) (hazardous waste management); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 44201–44210 (West 1996)
(solid waste management); MINN. STAT. §§ 626.90–626.93 (Supp. 2001) (between state and
tribal law enforcement); NEV. REV. STAT. 277.058 (Supp. 1999) (archeological or historical
sites); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-11-12.1 to 9-11-12.2 (Michie Supp. 2000) (tax administration);
OR. REV. STAT. § 25.075 (1999) (child support); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.25.010–26.25.040
(1999) (child welfare); Id. §§ 79.60.010–79.60.090 (timber and forest management)).
104. Id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (comparing the brief for petitioners with the
brief for respondents and stating that “[w]hether a consensual relationship . . . existed in this
case is debatable”).
105. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (comparing the majority opinion, id. at 2310 n.3,
with id. 2316).
106. Id. at 2310.
107. Id. at 2311.
108. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980))
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (quoting Mon-
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tween a tribe’s authority over nonmembers and a state’s authority
over tribal members, the Court explained that while “[t]ribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to
that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by
them,”110 state assertion of regulatory authority over tribal members
is allowed even on tribal lands “[w]hen . . . state interests outside the
reservation are implicated.”111
The Court found that “[s]elf-government and internal relations
[were] not directly at issue . . . since the issue [was] whether the
Tribes’ law will apply, not to their own members, but to a narrow
category of outsiders.”112 Dismissing Justice O’Connor’s argument
that the majority opinion “give[s] nonmembers freedom to act with
impunity on tribal land based solely on their status as state law enforcement officials,”113 the Court stated, “We do not say state officers cannot be regulated; we say they cannot be regulated in the performance of their law-enforcement duties.”114
The Court found three cases that validated the presumption that
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians off the reservation “entails the corollary right to enter a reservation . . . for enforcement purposes.”115 First, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation,116 the Court “reserved the question
whether state officials could seize cigarettes held for sale to nonmembers in order to recover the taxes due,”117 suggesting that states
might have this authority. Second, in Utah & Northern Railway Co.
v. Fisher,118 the Court noted that “process of [state] courts may run
into an Indian reservation . . . where the subject-matter or controversy is otherwise within their cognizance.”119 Finally, in United

tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981))).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2311–12 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)).
112. Id. at 2316.
113. Id. at 2332 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2317.
114. Id. at 2317. The Court points out that tribal members may still invoke state or federal authority to help them vindicate their rights. Id.
115. Id. at 2312.
116. 447 U.S. 134.
117. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 (citing Washington, 447 U.S. at 162).
118. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
119. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 (quoting Fisher, 116 U.S. at 31).
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States v. Kagama,120 the Court “expressed skepticism that the Indian
Commerce Clause could justify [federal court] authority in derogation of state jurisdiction,”121 but finally concluded that the Major
Crimes Act was valid because it did not “interfere with the process of
the State courts within the reservation, nor with the operation of
State laws upon white people found there.”122
Concluding that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in
executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state
laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations,”
the Court emphasized that giving the State the authority to exercise
process on reservation lands held in fee by Indians would impair
tribal government as little as the “federal enforcement of federal law
impairs state government.”123 Additionally, because the Court found
“[n]othing in the federal statutory scheme [to] prescribe[], or even
remotely suggest[], that state officials cannot enter a reservation . . .
to investigate or prosecute violations of state law occurring off the
reservation,” the Court concluded that Congress had not taken away
the state’s jurisdiction in Indian country.124 Finally, the Court relied
on Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe125 to assert that the “reservation of state authority to serve process [in federal enclaves] is necessary to ‘prevent [such areas] from becoming an asylum for fugitives
from justice.’”126
In her concurrence, however, Justice O’Connor pointed out that
in its analysis of Montana’s second exception, the Court failed to
show how “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing
process related to [an off-reservation violation of state law] is not es-

120. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
121. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312.
122. Id. at 2312 (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383).
123. Id. at 2313. The Court also emphasized the social costs of allowing the tribe to get
around the political integrity problem by suing the state wardens merely in their individual capacities. Id. (“‘Permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will
unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.’” (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987))).
124. Id.
125. 114 U.S. 525, 533 (1885).
126. Id. The Court’s holding implicitly overruled Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413
F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), where the Ninth Circuit held that “Arizona . . . could not enter the
[Navajo] reservation to seize [a] suspect for extradition since . . . this would interfere with
tribal self-government.” Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 n.6 (citing Merrill, 413 F.2d at 685–86).
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sential to tribal self-government or internal relations.”127 She explained that the mere fact that tribal and state governments share authority over state lands does not equate to a nullification of tribal interests “through a per se rule.”128
B. Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over § 1983 Claims
Although the majority concluded that the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribes had no authority to adjudicate Hicks’s claims under
Montana, the Hicks Court still analyzed the tribal court’s authority
to adjudicate § 1983 claims to ascertain whether such claims constituted congressional expansion of tribal-court jurisdiction.129 The
Court began its analysis by dismissing the fact that suit was brought
against the state officials in their individual capacities and concluding
that “a State ‘can act only through its officers and agents.’”130
Although the Court pointed out that state courts have general
jurisdiction under the Constitution,131 the Court held that tribal
courts “cannot be courts of general jurisdiction . . . for a tribe’s inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as
broad as its legislative jurisdiction.”132 The Court stated that the
“historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court
jurisdiction over federal-law cases is completely missing with respect
to tribal courts.”133
127. Id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2313).
128. Id. at 2329 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980)).
129. Id. at 2313–14 n.7 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)).
Section 1983 provides for liability for any person who, acting under the color of law, “subjects
. . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
Despite the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction was already limited by the Court’s analysis of
Montana, the Court found the additional determination of the Court’s jurisdiction over §
1983 claims necessary in order to ascertain whether Congress had enlarged tribal court jurisdiction, thus superceding the Montana test. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314 n.7. But see id. at 2332
n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not at all clear to me that the Court’s discussion of the §
1983 issue is necessary to the disposition of this case. [Strate] discusses the question whether a
tribal court can exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers, irrespective of the type of claim being
raised.” (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 n.14)).
130. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2313 (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)).
131. Id. at 2313–14.
132. Id. at 2314.
133. Id.; cf. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus pre-
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The Court emphasized that a severe anomaly would result from
giving tribal courts general jurisdiction over federal claims:
“[B]ecause the general federal-question removal statute refers only
to removal from state court, . . . [w]ere § 1983 claims cognizable in
tribal court, defendants would inexplicably lack the right available to
state-court § 1983 defendants to seek a federal forum.”134 It dismissed the notion that it could create a right for removal from tribal
court to federal court.135
Justice Stevens argued in his concurrence, however, that a tribal
court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over any federal claim
“unless enjoined from doing so by a federal court.”136 He argued
that the “majority’s analysis of [the] question [of § 1983 jurisdiction] is exactly backwards” and concluded that rather than
“start[ing] from the assumption that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear federal claims unless federal law expressly grants them
the power,”137 the Court should have allowed the tribe to assert general subject matter jurisdiction, should it choose, “unless federal law
dictates otherwise.”138 He also pointed out that “the majority’s hold-

sumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”). The
Court, however, failed to mention that Indian tribes had neither individual federal recognition
nor organized tribal courts at the time of the Constitution’s drafting.
134. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314. The Court held that
Strate’s limitation on jurisdiction over nonmembers pertains to subject-matter,
rather than merely personal, jurisdiction, since it turns upon whether the actions at
issue in the litigation are regulable by the tribe. One can of course say that even
courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction have general jurisdiction over those subjects that they can adjudicate . . . but that makes the concept of general jurisdiction
meaningless, and is assuredly not the criterion that would determine whether these
courts received authority to adjudicate § 1983 actions.
Id. at 2314 n.8.
135. Id. at 2314–15. The Government as amicus curiae based its argument for such removal on El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). See Brief of Amicus Curiae
United States at 24–26, Hicks (No. 99-1994), available at 2001 WL 28669. The Court, however, distinguished Neztsosie by pointing out that Neztsosie arose under Navajo tort claims that
the Price Anderson Act “provided ‘shall be deemed to be . . . action[s] arising under’ 42
U.S.C. § 2210; [thus] there was little doubt that the tribal court had jurisdiction over such
tort claims.” Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 482 n.4). The Court
also pointed out its reliance on the actual removal provisions of the Price Anderson Act, which
evidenced a congressional preference for federal courts. Id. at 2315.
136. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 2314.
138. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens cited Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981), where the Court determined that state law governs a
state’s subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance. Although the majority dismissed this case
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ing that tribal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983
suits would, presumably, bar those courts from hearing such claims
even if jurisdiction over nonmembers would be proper under
Strate.”139
IV. THE BEND IN THE ROAD: DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS OF
JURISDICTIONAL TESTS
The majority’s failure to properly apply its recognized tests for
jurisdiction resulted in a decision that severely limits a tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. The Court’s decision has two fatal flaws
that may affect the ability of tribes to assert their jurisdiction in the
future. First, the majority’s failure to properly apply Montana resulted in a constriction of the Court’s precedent regarding the role
of land ownership and Montana’s exceptions. Second, the majority’s
failure to give the tribal court an opportunity to determine its jurisdiction over § 1983 claims suggests that exhaustion has become an
exception, rather than the rule. This section will address each of
these concerns in turn.

by emphasizing that the Constitution grants states general adjudicatory authority, while granting no such authority to tribes, see Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314, Justice Stevens argued that the
key principle to consider was “the simple, common-sense notion that it is the body creating a
court that determines what sorts of claims that court will hear.” Id. at 2333 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See generally Nat’l Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851, 856
(1985) (Because “tribes . . . retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing political
communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North America,” jurisdictional determinations “should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself.”
(citations omitted)).
139. Id. at 2333 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The majority claims that “Strate is [the] ‘federal law to the contrary’” that explains
its restriction of tribal court subject-matter jurisdiction over § 1983 suits. But Strate
merely concerned the circumstances under which tribal courts can exert jurisdiction
over claims against nonmembers. It most certainly does not address the question
whether, assuming such jurisdiction to exist, tribal courts can entertain § 1983
suits . . . .
Of course, if the majority, as it suggests, is merely holding that § 1983 does
not enlarge tribal jurisdiction beyond what is permitted by Strate, its decision today
is far more limited than it might first appear from the Court’s sometimes sweeping
language. After all, if the Court’s holding is that § 1983 merely fails to “enlarg[e]”
tribal-court jurisdiction, then nothing would prevent tribal courts from deciding §
1983 claims in cases in which they properly exercise jurisdiction under Strate.
Id. (citations omitted).
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A. Constriction of the Montana Test

The majority changed the Montana analysis in three ways. First,
it eliminated land status as a threshold consideration. Next, it constricted the meaning of both Montana exceptions.
1. Character of land
In contrast to the Montana Court, the Hicks Court failed to analyze land ownership as a threshold consideration, instead making
land ownership a mere factor in the analysis of Montana’s exceptions. In Montana, the Court considered whether the tribe had jurisdiction over activities within the borders of the reservation solely
because those lands belonged in fee to nonmembers, acknowledging
that had the tribe sought to regulate activities on tribal lands, it
would have had the authority to do so.140 Limiting its holding to
“the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of
the Tribe,” the Montana Court found that a tribe does not have the
authority to regulate non-Indian activities on lands not owned by the
tribe or its members.141
Other cases have attached a similar importance to land status. In
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,142 the Court stated that
“there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty.”143 Brendale, although a plurality opinion, set forth the rule
that the “the extent to which the tribes maintained ownership and
control over the areas in which the parcels were located” dictated
whether the tribe had power to zone the particular tract.144 In Strate,
the Court specifically left open the question of tribal jurisdiction over
an automobile accident occurring on a reservation road.145 Finally, in
140. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). The Court affirmed that the
tribe could both exclude nonmembers from the land and condition nonmembers’ entry onto
the land. See id.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
143. Id. at 151.
144. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2326 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 438–47 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
145. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1999) (“We express no view on
the governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation.”).
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Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, decided just one month before
Hicks, the Court found the character of land significant when it determined that a tribe’s power to tax “only extended to ‘transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its
members.’”146
This case law suggests that the majority in Hicks mischaracterized
Montana when it dismissed land ownership as only one factor in the
analysis of a tribe’s jurisdiction.147 In her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor set forth the rule that the Court should have followed—
the Court should have recognized that “tribes retain sovereign interests in activities that occur on land owned and controlled by the
tribe”148 and should have analyzed “whether [the state wardens’] activities . . . implicate these sovereign interests to a degree that tribal
civil jurisdiction is appropriate.”149
Not only does land ownership play a role in the initial jurisdictional analysis, but it also evidences the power to exclude, a necessary
attribute of self-government.150 Land ownership is crucial in determining the “extent to which the tribes maintained ownership and
control.”151 Hicks, a tribal member, owned the land on which the
146. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Atkinson Trading
Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1831 (2001) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982))) (emphasis added).
147. See id. at 2310.
148. Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2329 (O’Connor, J. concurring); see also Skibine, Making Sense, supra note
95, at 349, 355–59 (arguing that “one of the fundamental problems with the Court’s [Hicks]
analysis stems from its failure to adequately conceptualize the so-called tribal ‘right-toexclude’”).
151. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2326 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 438–44, 444–47 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137, 149). Justice O’Connor also pointed out that Montana
emphasized the attributes of sovereignty that tribes retain, rather than focusing on only the
attributes they lost:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on nonIndian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means,
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A
tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare of the tribe.
Id. at 2326 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,

162

4REE.DOC

137]

3/23/02 11:52 AM

Native American Sovereignty

alleged tort actions occurred. The tribe had significant control over
his land and the nature of governmental intrusions into the land, as
evidenced by the fact that the tribal court approved both search warrants and tribal officials accompanied the state wardens in performing
the search.152 The Court’s dismissal of the importance of land ownership suggests a constriction of an important aspect of Montana’s
holding.
Although Justice Souter pointed out in his concurrence that using mere land ownership to determine jurisdiction would result in an
unworkable rule because jurisdiction would change just as quickly as
title was conveyed, leaving the competing governmental authorities
without accurate information about whether they had jurisdiction,153
he failed to recognize that the Court has previously found checkered
jurisdictional patterns constitutional.154 Additionally, the working relationship between Nevada and the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes
evidenced in this case,155 suggests that administrative difficulties
could be overcome.
2. The consensual relations exception
Another glaring problem with the Court’s application of Montana is its dismissal of the possibility of a consensual relationship between states and tribes, as well as its disregard for such relationships
already in existence.156 Even supposing that a consensual relationship
did not exist in Hicks,157 “creat[ing] a per se rule . . . forecloses future debate as to whether cooperative agreements, or other forms of
official consent, could ever be a basis for tribal jurisdiction.”158 The
Hicks holding places tribes at a severe disadvantage in enforcing their
565–66 (1981)).
152. Id. at 2308.
153. Id. at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring).
154. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
535 (1974) (finding checkerboard jurisdiction asserted by the state government constitutional).
155. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2308; id. at 2330 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
156. See id. at 2327–28, 2330 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that tribes often enter into contractual relationships with state governments, for instance, for the use of public
resources, and pointing out that “[s]ome states have formally sanctioned the creation of tribalstate agreements”); see also supra note 103.
157. See supra note 104.
158. Id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The majority disclaims having rejected this.
See id. at 2310 n.3; id. at 2316.
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rights under such state-tribe agreements because states could simply
fail to perform under such an agreement and tribes would have only
the remedy of suing through the federal government.159
3. The political integrity exception
In addition to entirely disregarding Montana’s first exception,
the majority limited Montana’s second exception to be practically
meaningless by suggesting that only those specific activities enumerated in Montana constitute situations where tribes can assert jurisdiction in order to protect self-government.160
The Court relied on Justice White’s Brendale reasoning “that a
tribe’s authority need not extend to all conduct that ‘threatens or has
some direct effect’ . . . but instead depends on the circumstances.”161
However, the reasoning of the Brendale plurality fails to allow for
other possible activities that may threaten a tribe’s political integrity,
including unregulated state service of process. As Justice Scalia stated
for the majority in Hicks, a judicial opinion is only an opinion;162
opinions may be revisited and reinterpreted.
Additionally, the Court failed to consider the effect of state regulation on the tribe. Although the Court has firmly established that
159. A suit directly against the state would probably be struck down under the Eleventh
Amendment. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that states have Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity against suits by Indian tribes arising under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988)). Even if the state allowed suit, a
tribe would be unlikely to find redress of their rights in a suit adjudicated by the very entity
that deprived them of their rights.
160. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2311 (“[T]ribes have authority ‘[to punish tribal offenders,] to
determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe
rules of inheritance for members . . . .’” (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
564 (1981); and citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997))).
161. Althouse, supra note 15, at 736 (quoting Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 429 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
162. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2316 (referring to the Montana case by emphasizing, “this
is an opinion, bear in mind, not a statute”); see also id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted):
The majority . . . dismisses the applicability of [the consensual relations] exception
in a footnote, concluding that any consensual relationship between tribes and nonmembers “clearly” must be a “private” consensual relationship “from which the official actions at issue in this case are far removed.”
The majority provides no support for this assertion. The Court’s decision in
Montana did not and could not have resolved the complete scope of the first exception. We could only apply the first exception to the activities presented in that case,
namely, hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land owned in fee simple by nonmembers.
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“the Indians’ right to make their own laws and be governed by them
does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation”
and in some cases “[s]tate sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s
border,”163 in each case where the Court has determined that states
have authority in Indian country, the Court has gone through a factintensive analysis of (1) whether an express congressional grant of
power for state authority in Indian country exists,164 and, if not, (2)
whether the state action is preempted by federal law (balancing the
state needs with tribal and federal interests in Indian selfgovernment)165 and (3) whether the state action infringes on reservation Indians’ right “to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”166 State authority is limited when it is preempted by federal
law, unlawfully interferes with the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them, or violates Congress’s
constitutional authority to regulate Indians under the Commerce
Clause.167
Justice O’Connor concluded in her concurrence that the Court
failed to show how regulation of state wardens “executing process
related to [an off-reservation violation of state law] is not essential to
tribal self-government or internal relations.”168 Additionally, Justice
163. Id. at 2311. But see Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878); Langford v. Monteith,
102 U.S. 145 (1880) (suggesting that state process may not reach Indian reservations because
they are jurisdictional enclaves).
164. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (“Essentially, absent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”).
165. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 156 (1980) (“The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent
sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the
Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.”
(citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973))). The test of
tribal preemption applies when Congress has not spoken specifically on a subject and assumes
that Congress intended to favor the tribe but balances this assumption with the state’s interest
in exercising authority in Indian country. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163, 176–77 (1989) (discussing the differences between regular federal preemption and
tribal preemption); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983)
(same). The test asks (1) if the state law obstructs federal policies in federal law, (2) whether
this obstruction results in an impossibility of the tribe meeting federal requirements, and (3)
whether the state’s interests are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. See White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 144–45, 148–49 (1980).
166. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220; see also Bracker, 448 U.S. at 442. Notably, this test only
applies when non-Indians are involved. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164.
167. See Washington, 447 U.S. 134.
168. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2313). She
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O’Connor noted that the Court excluded analysis regarding whether
the officials were actually acting within the scope of their duties,
suggesting that state officials might be liable individually if acting
outside that scope.169 Hicks brought suit because the state officials
“exceeded the scope of the search warrants and damaged . . . personal property.”170 Regulating the execution of a search process is an
important part of maintaining tribal sovereignty.171 In fact, “[t]he actions of state officials on tribal land in some instances may affect
tribal sovereign interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than the actions of private parties.”172
Finally, Justice O’Connor argued that a tribe should not lose its
“sovereign interests with respect to nonmember activities on its land
. . . simply because the nonmembers in this case are state officials enforcing state law.”173 “[C]ases concerning tribal power often involve
the competing interests of state, federal, and tribal governments,”174
and “case law does not support a broad per se rule prohibiting tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal land whenever the nonmembers are state officials.”175

explains that the mere fact that tribal and state governments share authority over state lands
does not equate with a nullification of tribal interests “through a per se rule.” Id. at 2329 (citing Washington, 447 U.S. at 156).
169. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court holds that the state officials may not be
held liable in Tribal Court for these actions, but never explains where these, or more serious
allegations involving a breach of authority, would fall within its new rule of state official immunity.”).
170. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
171. At least the State of Nevada thought so, as it originally conditioned the state officials’ execution of process upon their obtaining permission from the tribal court. See id. at
2308.
172. Id. at 2329 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Although private parties do not have the
same authority and duties as state officials, certainly a state official exceeding the bounds of his
or her duty should be subject to tribal courts.
173. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) Justice O’Connor would have remanded the case for
a proper application of Montana. Id. at 2329–30 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (comparing State
v. Hicks 196 F.3d 1020, 1032–34 (1999) (Rymer, J., dissenting) with Nevada v. Hicks, 944
F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996)); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695–
96 (1993). She stated,
I do not believe that the Court properly has applied Montana. I would not
adopt a per se rule of tribal jurisdiction that fails to consider adequately the Tribe’s
inherent sovereign interests in activities on their land, nor would I give nonmembers
freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based solely on their status as state law
enforcement officials. I would hold that Montana governs a tribe’s civil jurisdiction
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Justice O’Connor admittedly failed to address the fact that courts
have generally required the tribe, rather than merely an individual, to
show actual harm before asserting that tribal regulation is required to
preserve tribal interests.176 Nevertheless, the majority failed to analyze the effect on the tribe at all, instead limiting the list of situations
in which tribal regulation may be warranted to only those situations
mentioned in Montana. Each scenario under Montana where a tribe
may exercise regulatory authority—punishing tribal offenders, determining tribal membership, regulating domestic relations among
members, or prescribing rules of inheritance—is a situation over
which tribes already would have retained authority under Wheeler
because the incidents involve only internal affairs among tribal members.177 Therefore, a Montana analysis to determine tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers in these situations would not even be necessary.
The majority based its conclusion that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off
reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or
internal relations” in part on the assumption that giving states auover nonmembers, and that in order to protect government officials, immunity
claims should be considered in reviewing tribal court jurisdiction.
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2332 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Hicks argued in his Supreme Court brief that the Court’s approval of the search warrants served as a basis for jurisdiction:
As to the second Montana exception, the alleged violations of the rights of a
tribal member . . . threaten the tribe’s political integrity and welfare. To maintain its
political integrity, effectiveness and ability to provide a judicial forum for those . . .
who live under tribal law and jurisdiction and rely upon the court and its justice, the
Fallon tribal court must be able to supervise the warrants it issues . . . . Respect for
the limits set by a tribal court should be the same accorded to the limits on warrants
issued by state or federal courts. To say that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction
over claims against individuals purporting to act on the authority of the tribal courts
would be to truncate tribal power to enforce tribal laws on tribal land and throughout the reservation. Applying such a rule in this case would mean that the tribal
court, in approving warrants to state officials, has no power to require that searches
under those warrants be conducted according to the tribal court’s restrictions and
limitations.
Respondents’ Brief, 2001 WL 57509, at *15, Hicks (No. 99-1994).
176. See, for instance, Justice White’s opinion in Brendale, where he held that in order
for the Yakima Indian Nation to have preemptive authority to zone on reservation lands, they
would first have to show how the county’s zoning power would harm the tribe’s political integrity. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
432 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
177. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (finding that tribes retain authority over their internal affairs); see also supra note 8 (discussing Wheeler’s internal/external
distinction).
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thority to exercise process on reservation lands held in fee by Indians
would impair tribal governments as little as the “federal enforcement
of federal law impairs state government.”178 Yet, the Court failed to
acknowledge the special relationship that exists between tribes and
the federal government.179 While states do not need protection from
the federal government because of safeguards built into the federal
Constitution, tribes need protection from state governments. Allowing state officials unchecked access onto tribal lands in order to serve
process could lead to an abuse of state power.180
B. Possible Limits on Tribal Jurisdiction over Federal Claims
Neztsosie makes clear that, absent plain legislative intent evidencing otherwise, tribal courts generally have jurisdiction over federal
claims: “Under normal circumstances, tribal courts, like state courts,
can and do decide questions of federal law, and there is no reason to
think that questions of federal preemption are any different.”181 In
178. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2313.
179. See supra note 5.
180. States have historically fought against tribal sovereignty and self-government. See,
e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to
regulate Indian gaming found unconstitutional); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226 (1985) (suit by tribe against state for unlawful possession of land); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831) (discussing state attempts to allow white
settlers onto Indian lands).
Respondent Hicks argued in his brief,
The contemporary reality for the present case includes considerations of the negative
impact on needed state-tribal cooperation that would potentially follow a decision of
this Court providing state law enforcement officials with blanket immunity from
tribal authority. Only recently have tribes and states been able to find sufficient
common ground and respect for each other’s sovereignty in order to establish cooperative arrangements for law enforcement and other mutual governance concerns. A
decision rendering state officials completely immune from suit in tribal court, while
leaving tribal officials exposed to suit in state courts, will significantly undermine this
complex, burgeoning and vitally necessary framework of state-tribal intergovernmental cooperation, by creating disincentives for tribal government officials who are
asked to permit state officials onto tribal lands to enforce state laws.
Respondents’ Brief, 2001 WL 57509, at *7, Hicks (No. 99-1994).
The flaw in this analysis, though, is that it suggests that tribes are somehow inferior to
state governments and therefore need special protection from states. Cf. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (“[P]referential programs [for African Americans]
may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.”).
181. El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 485 n.7 (1999). Although the defendants in this case do not have to exhaust their remedies in tribal court, the Court explains
that this results from the removal requirement placed in the statute. See id. at 485–86.
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reaching his conclusion that tribal courts have no adjudicative authority, Justice Scalia relied on Strate v. A-1 Contractors where the
Court stated, “As to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”182 However, Justice
Scalia took this statement out of context. The Court in Neztsosie
clarified that “Strate dealt with claims against nonmembers arising
on state highways, and ‘express[ed] no view on the governing law or
proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation.’”183 Further, the El Paso Court found that a simple assertion by the defendants that the tribe lacked jurisdiction under the
Price-Anderson Act (because tribes do not have authority to regulate
atomic energy) did not satisfy the question of tribal jurisdiction.184
Unlike Strate, but like Neztsosie, Hicks arose out of actions that
took place on tribal lands. Prior precedent declared that in order to
determine that an Indian tribe lacks authority to try § 1983 suits, the
Court must examine the extent to which the tribe’s “sovereignty has
been altered, divested, or diminished” and evaluate the “relevant
statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”185 The Hicks Court
performed none of this analysis in its opinion, thus suggesting, contrary to precedent, that tribal courts can never adjudicate federal
claims.
V. LOOKING AROUND THE BEND: THE FUTURE OF
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
After Hicks, future application of the Montana test remains questionable and could take one of two possible routes. However, regardless of the outcome of a Montana analysis, based on the Court’s
treatment of a tribe’s authority to try § 1983 claims, tribes are likely
to have little jurisdiction over federal claims.
A. The Future of Montana
Montana rested in part upon a threshold consideration of land
status. Where land was owned in fee by the tribe or held in trust for
182. 520 U.S. 438, 453; see Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309, 2314.
183. 526 U.S. at 482 n.4 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 442).
184. See id. at 482–83.
185. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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the tribe, Montana suggested that tribes would have authority to
regulate activities occurring on that land. However, the majority in
Hicks relegated land status from a threshold question to a mere factor in the analysis of Montana’s exceptions. Thus, the emphasis that
the Court places on land status in the future will set the framework
for the entire Montana test.186
The Hicks holding is limited to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state officials, leaving open the question of jurisdiction
over nonmembers in general.187 Land could possibly be more than a
mere factor in a context not involving state officials.188 The Supreme
Court may take two approaches as it applies the Hicks revised Montana test to future cases: It may either limit its holding to facts similar to those in Hicks, the execution of a state search warrant on a reservation for an off-reservation state offense, or it may interpret Hicks
broadly to limit tribal jurisdiction on tribal lands to those cases falling under the narrow Montana exceptions defined in Hicks.
Lower courts in the short time since Hicks was adjudicated have
followed the first approach, categorizing Hicks as applying only to a
narrow class of cases where state officials are exercising process on a
reservation for off-reservation offenses.189 However, the unwilling186. See Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 119–20:
Prior to Hicks, most legal analysts read the Montana “rule” as applying only in
circumstances where tribal civil authority was asserted over non-members on their
fee lands within the reservation. In other words, tribal civil jurisdiction over all persons on tribal trust lands was presumptively acknowledged, or, in Montana’s terms,
viewed as “necessary to protect tribal self-government.” Indeed, this is the view
taken by Justice O’Connor (joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens) . . . . But the majority in Hicks said, “Not necessarily.” According to the Court, the general rule of
Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land . . . .
187. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309 n.2.
188. But see Krakoff, supra note 56, at 1233–34 (2001) (“There is some room left to
speculate that other circumstances might also warrant the exertion of tribal authority over nonmembers, but the presumption certainly runs against the tribes.”).
189. In Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, No. 99-2618, 2001 WL 1117281 (7th Cir.
Sept. 21, 2001), the court articulated the holding of Hicks as follows: “[T]ribal authorities
lacked legislative jurisdiction to regulate the activities of state officials on reservation land when
those officials were investigating off-reservation violations of state law.” Id. at *1 (citing Hicks,
121 S. Ct. at 2318). The court noted that because the issue at bar, the grant of TAS status
under the Clean Water Act to the Mole Lake Band, did not “involve any question of the tribe’s
ability to restrict activities of state law enforcement authorities on the reservation, when those
officials [were] investigating off-reservation crimes, . . . the rule of Hicks . . . [was] not implicated.” Id. at *6; see also United States v. Archambault, No. CR 00-30089, 2001 WL
1297767, at *15 (D.S.D. Oct. 18, 2001) (rejecting application of Hicks to a double jeopardy
question arising from tribal prosecution of a nonmember Indian); Prairie Band of Potawatomi
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ness of these courts to expand the Hicks holding may be due merely
to a desire not to be overruled.
Despite the assertion of Hicks’s limited holding, the Supreme
Court Justices gave little surety that Hicks would actually be limited
as stated. Four Justices, Justice O’Connor, Justice Breyer, Justice
Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg, held that land ownership is a factor in
determining tribal authority.190 Justice Ginsburg clarified in her concurrence that Justice Scalia’s majority holding is limited to tribal
court jurisdiction over state officials executing state law, suggesting
that in other cases land status could be a large factor and that the
question of tribal jurisdiction on tribal land over nonmembers still
exists.191 However, no other member of the Court joined her concurrence,192 and Justice Souter held in his concurrence193 that land
ownership is not a factor and that the Court should proceed directly
to the Montana test in determining tribal jurisdiction.194 Although
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia left no clear opinion about the status of
land ownership,195 neither justice has historically defended tribal sovereignty.196

Indians v. Richards, No. 99-4136-DES, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2284 (D. Kan. Feb. 8, 2002)
(rejecting application of Hicks to the issue of whether a plaintiff tribe may enjoin officials of the
State of Kansas from “applying or enforcing Kansas motor vehicle registration or titling laws
against [an Indian tribe and those who] operate or own a vehicle registered or titled under [the
tribe’s] registration code”); Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 120 (“While the Hicks holding
is narrow—state officers are not subject to tribal regulation in the performance of their lawenforcement duties—our main concern lies with the majority’s analysis that subjects inherent
tribal authority to challenge by nonmembers, even when exercised on tribal trust lands.”).
190. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2324 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2324–2333
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens); id. at 2333–2334 (Stevens, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Breyer). Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence suggests that
land ownership is a large factor. See id. at 2324 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
191. See id. at 2324 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
192. See also Krakoff, supra note 56, at 1236 (suggesting that because Justice Ginsburg
joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion her concurrence lacks credibility).
193. Justice Souter was joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy.
194. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2318 (Souter, J., concurring).
195. Justice Scalia did state in his majority opinion that “[t]he question . . . whether
tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction are coextensive is simply answered by the concurrence in the affirmative. As Justice Souter’s separate opinion demonstrates, it surely deserves
more considered analysis.” Id. at 2318.
196. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that injury under Montana’s second exception must be “demonstrably serious and must imperil” the tribe, establishing a higher hurdle than Montana); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that Congress did not
have power to allow suits by tribes against states under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act);
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The second approach that the Court could take would be to follow Justice Souter’s reasoning by applying the Montana test, even on
tribal and trust land. This view would virtually eliminate land status
as a threshold fact in the analysis of tribal jurisdiction. Those who believe that Hicks will open the door for future adoption of Justice
Souter’s approach base their fears on the idea that the case evidences
a “jurisprudential trend advancing the sovereignty of states and the
interests of nontribal members in Indian country at the expense of
tribal rights to self-determination.”197 Ultimately, this fear reflects
the Court’s apparent concern for the rights of nonmembers who may
not participate in tribal government and may be tried in tribal courts
with no federal court review or constitutional protections equal to
those of defendants in state and federal courts.198
B. The Future of Tribal Adjudication of Federal Claims
While the exact application of Montana in future cases is uncertain, the Court has made it clear that no presumption favors tribal
U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Sioux
Nation should not receive compensation for lands taken in the Black Hills because it contributed to violence on the frontier); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 177 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) (rejecting a
balancing of state and tribal interests for determining state authority to impose tax on reservation cigarette sales because “Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent”);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.) (no inherent tribal
authority to criminally try nonmembers); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Scalia joined in this opinion arguing that Public Law
280 granted California the right to regulate and prohibit reservation gaming although other
forms of gaming were permissible in California.). See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie
Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1995) (“As
Chief Justice, [Rehnquist] has taken a general position against the sovereignty of Indian people, and has upheld Indian self-government only to the extent that non-Indians are not affected.”).
197. Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 118 (“In advocating narrow conceptions of
tribal authority, the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence has increasingly reflected an ideology
significantly at odds with that of the other branches of the federal government and, indeed,
with emerging international norms respecting the human rights of indigenous peoples to selfdetermination and to maintain their own cultures.”).
198. See id. at 118 (“[T]he key animating principle of [the Court’s] Indian law jurisprudence is solicitous protection of the interests of nontribal members . . . .”); Skibine, Making
Sense, supra note 95, at 362 (“[I]n order to show jurisdiction over nonmembers, tribes will
likely have to show that Congress has somehow authorized them to exercise civil powers over
nonmembers through special legislation, treaties, or a federal preemption-type of analysis.”).
Cf. Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its
Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 303 (2000), quoted in
Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 119.
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court adjudication of federal claims, primarily because at this point in
time no federal court review is available for such claims.199 This reasoning focuses on protection of those who are not tribal members,
rather than its previous course of maintaining the rights of tribal
members. The ultimate conclusion of the case is clear—the Court
will not hesitate to block tribal authority when the exercise of that
authority stands in the way of the authority of other sovereigns.200
VI. CONCLUSION
Hicks, a resident on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian Reservation, sought to assert his right to keep state officials from unnecessarily interfering with his property. Instead of recognizing that his lawsuit had merit, the Court summarily dismissed the suit from tribal
court with a holding that, if liberally construed, would virtually
eliminate tribal sovereignty over nonmembers on tribal land while at
the same time favoring a broad grant of state authority over tribal
members on tribal land.201
Federal Indian law is a complicated field, especially in the area of
civil jurisdiction. In order to allow tribes and states to see clearly how
to act, the Court must clearly and accurately apply its own common
law. The only clear guideline that this case has produced is that tribal
members’ assertion of claims against nonmembers will almost certainly not withstand judicial review if asserted against state officials
and, depending on how the Court interprets the breadth of its holding, may not even withstand judicial review if asserted against any
nonmember.

199. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314.
200. See generally David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s defense of states’ rights and resulting abrogation of tribal
rights).
201. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2311 (2001) (“State sovereignty does not end at a reservations border. . . . ‘Ordinarily,’ it is now clear, ‘an Indian reservation is considered part of the
territory of the State.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 510 & n.1
(1958); and citing Utah & Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885))).
What the Hicks Court failed to consider is that since Fisher, several Supreme Court cases
have found express limits on state authority in Indian country. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448
U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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The Court’s deviation from its well-worn jurisdictional tests
leaves tribes not only without the security of known roads, but also
without the security of continued vitality of their sovereignty. By recharacterizing Montana and limiting tribal authority to try federal
claims, the majority charted a future course for tribal sovereignty on
a road covered with pitfalls.
Melanie Reed
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